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Yokoi Shonan (1809-1869) had a major in°uence as a philosopher
from the end of the shogunate period to the modern period in terms of
his political-economic thought. However, it does not appear that there
are so many achievements to his name in relation to the framework of
his economic thought to justify why he is regarded as a great thinker.
The aim of this note is to see what role his thought played in the
stream of thought that helped form modern Japan, through looking at
the framework of his economic thought in the formation of `enriching
the country', that is to say, through inquiring about Yokoi's comparative
system between `reciprocal living' and `enriching the country'.
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I Introduction
Yokoi Shonan (1809-1869) had a major in°uence in terms of his political-
economic thought, regardless of enlightened politicians, bureaucrats and
`high minded patriots overthrowing the Tokugawa' at the end of the
shogunate period. While he was a typical philosopher in Japan's transition
stage from the early modern to the modern period (Yamaguchi [1971],
715), it does not appear that there are so many achievements to his
name in relation to the framework of his economic thought to justify
why he is regarded as a great thinker1).
My article deals with Yokoi's political economic analysis of Jimusaku
(the Urgent Policy Report in the domain of Kumamoto) against the
Kumamoto han (the domain of Kumamoto), especially as regards `the
government of moneymaking' under the monopoly system. The policy
subject of a trade-o® existed in the assumption of Jimusaku because
Yokoi had already acknowledged the trade-o® between the `pro¯ts of
trade' and `reciprocal living', or between `belief' and `an increase in
money-pro¯ts' as the logic of the West, which Toyotomi Hideyoshi had
clearly recognised. As for the relationship between economic development
and foreign trade, as long as Yokoi continued `the antinomic doctrine of
interests', his expectation about the function of government in relation
to development was not positive. In other words, there was a big
1) According to Morris-Suzuki [1989], if `the main innovation that Yokoi brought
to social thought was a form of pragmatism' through the `Realist' school
(Jitsugaku)(p.39), how the mechanism of de¯nite `innovation' was actually
concretely formed and the manners in which it was reformed within the
framework of modern economic thought are very important. However, even
Yamazaki who treated `social economic thought of Yokoi Shonan' as a kind of
classical economic thought with care, tried to understand `modern meanings
of economic thought, through arranging the process of economic theory from
Adam Smith's moral philosophy', neglecting the framework of Yokoi's economic
thought (Yamazaki [1998], 3).
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contradiction in supporting the innovative idea of `the public way of
the world' or `the reason for international trade' as `the theory of
heaven and earth', and leading to `a national policy' and the function
of government being based on this.
Next, when Yokoi recognised that `the great cause in the world'
was `the public reason of the world', following a visit by Perry, how
did he solve `the three generations' rule' in `the way to public welfare
through its interests' in `enriching the country' through Three National
Policies, from the structural outline of economic growth on `the reason
for international trade' to a change in economic thought? Was the
strategy that was changed to industry thought out for the nation's
economy? Why were the open system and the various policies for their
investment and ¯nance found under any `great cause'? Furthermore,
how did Yokoi's alternative policy thought, which varied between `belief'
and `an increase in pro¯ts', develop `the opening up of Japan' from
`the public way of the world', acknowledging the reciprocal interests of
trade?
My aim is to see what role his thought played in the stream of thought
that helped form modern Japan, through looking at the framework of
his economic thought in the formation of `enriching the country' in the
Three National Policies.
II `The reciprocal opening' and Yokoi's early political
economic thought
While studying in Edo, Yokoi Shonan understood for the ¯rst time
that `the opening and closing of communications' was a theme which
had closely been linked with `enriching the country' for all of Japan2).
2) Throughout Yokoi's life, he endeavoured to pursue his studies and to be
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He knew that Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537-1598) had already tried to solve
the alternative problem between the prohibition of Christianity and `the
interest of trade', through the translation of the National Seclusion
Discourse by Shizuki Tadao, which was written by Engelbert Kaempfer
(1651-1716) as History of Japan (Nippon Shiseki Kyokai [1977b]? 809-
810). Through the technique of `the method of temporarily limiting
movement' by `exactness of discussion' (so-called historical empiricism),
he considered this problem as `a realist' direction (Jitsugaku) for political
economy.
When thinking about the political economy in the Japanese comparative
system, di®erent from `the principle of trade' in the West, the policy
decision beyond `the principle of trade', namely so-called `isolation policy',
was the criterion for `to follow the heaven' and for `Benevolence'. Any
western direction that `was threatened by battleships and ¯rearms' was
neither `Benevolence' nor the logic for `the heaven' through `pro¯ts of
trade' (Nippon Shiseki Kyokai [1977b]?692-693).
It was because of an important problem which this policy-making
exceeded the economic problem of Japan that the early Yokoi complimented
the isolation policy as `magni¯cent discernment by Ho-Taiko'. That is,
it was not a compatible theme between economic problems which dealt
with `an increase in money-pro¯ts' and invisibly religious problems which
Taiko clearly worried, but rather was an alternative problem in `the
independent, as he was born as samurai's second son and did not have
inheritance rights to the family stipend. However, a big issue was that the
educational policy and programme in Jishukan, the school established by the
Kumamoto han, contained only impractical ideas, did not deal with the current
political economy, and lacked the methodology to study it (Motoda [1969];
Yamazaki [1938], 100)?Yokoi's critical stance against the school system and
the high-ranking han government o±cials clearly caused di±culties for him
in the ¯rst half of his life.
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large harm' between `great riches' and `belief' (Nippon Shiseki Kyokai
[1977b]?809-810). `Magni¯cent discernment by Taiko'3) which Yokoi told
meant to establish the relative system that was created by the limit of
the framework between `an increase of pro¯ts' and `the propagation of
Christianity', in terms of the source of national uneasiness.
Yokoi actually pointed out if the relative system chooses Japan or the
West the stream of the ban on Christianity to sacri¯ce `great riches'
can be current or not. As for his early vision of political economy in
his Miscellaneous Impressive Memos in Studying in Edo and his `the
Reading of the National Seclusion Discourse', let us assume that the
issue of the pro¯t from trade in both Japan and the West is a value
of a, the issue of the ban on Christianity in Japan and the pro¯t from
trade with the West is a value of b, the issue of the pro¯t from trade
in Japan and accepting of the ban on Christianity in the West is a
value of c, and the issue of `the isolation policy' rather than the pro¯t
from the trade through the ban on Christianity in both Japan and the
West is a value of d. In addition, let us assume that the relation of
each value is b>a>c>d.
??????????? ????? ???
????? ? ?
??? ? ?
According to the early Yokoi's assumption, Taiko is independent under
the game for extensive form regarding the relations between `the interest
from trade' and `the national uneasiness" in Japan. That is to say,
if Japanese basis is not in trade like the West, and if the value of
`the source of uneasiness in Japan' is bigger than the value of trade
because of possible independent economy; his ban on Christianity will
3) The honori¯c title for a regent is Toyotomi Hideyoshi in this case.
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overwhelm trade and arrive at the national seclusion. Even if Japan
temporarily chose `the interest from trade', the system of the national
seclusion would be maintained from his explanation when the ratio of
`the source of uneasiness in Japan' is constantly bigger than that of
`pro¯ts of trade'.
III The contents of Jimusaku [The Urgent Policy Report
in the domain of Kumamoto] and its analysis
If the choice of `the isolation policy' by Taiko from the antinomy or `the
opening and closing of communications' is recognised by the independent
economy under the bakuhan system (the theory on shogunate ruling
system), how are `enriching the country' and `public welfare through
interests' investigated through the individual analysis developed in each
region and han (domain)?
Jimusaku, which appears to have been written by Yokoi around 18434),
was a draft against the Kumamoto han administration as a political
and economic organisation, depending on his `exactness of discussion'
after his return to Kumamoto. The contents of Jimusaku are manly
divided into three parts; `the politics of thrift', which sought the ideal
way for the consumption economy system in the Kumamoto district;
`the politics of money-making', which discussed the han ¯nancial system;
and `the city institution', which dealt with the urban problems of the
castle city, Kumomoto.
However, as Yokoi's nephew, Tokutomi Soho5), had already interested
4) Cf., Nippon Shiseki Kyokai [1977a], 65; Mikami [1999], 21.
5) (1863-1957). A journalist and author who is representative of modern Japan. He
was born in Kumamoto. Failing to Doshisha (Doshisha University today), he
published Kokumin-no-tomo (The Nation's Friend) and Kokumin Shinbun (The
National Newspaper), and advocated Heimin-shugi (the commoner principle).
He led the publication world after the Sino-Japanese War and wrote books.
Yoshida Shoin and Japanese National History in the Early Modern age are
his important works.
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in Jimusaku, this writing has some characteristics that mean it should
be considered as a prototype of Yokoi's main work, the Three National
Policies. Jimusaku was a political and economic analysis of the system
of isolation as comparative system, and contained his early vision of
political economy as outlined in his Miscellaneous Impressive Memos in
Studying in Edo and `The Reading of the National Seclusion Discourse'.
(1) `Politics of thrift'
The opening phrase of Jimusaku, `Customs and nature have lasted
peacefully for 200 years', meant that there had been a `peaceful'
economic structure in place in Kumamoto too, under the limiting
framework between `an increase in money-pro¯ts' and `the propagation
of Christianity'. Improvements in the level of consumption under the
closed system produced not only a nationwide `loosening and disorder
concerning the discipline, morality and the institutions of law', but also
extremely high price for Higo rice, which was a rich source of wealth
for Kumamoto as a result of the very bad crop at Tenpo. Moreover,
the money supply was increased as a result of the coinage policy of
the shogunate, from Bunsei to Tenpo, through `a large amount of both
gold and silver coins' in°ows'. Of course, the in°uence of this monetary
policy on Kumamoto needs a detailed examination in relation to the
extent of the multiplier e®ect on a ¯scal expansionary policy in the
shogunate, or the elasticity of supply in Kumamoto corresponding to
this ¯scal expansion. Moreover, it is important to consider the sensitivity
of the investment to the interest rate.
However, the multiplier e®ect on the real sector by ¯scal expenditure,
the upper shift in the aggregate demand curve by the wealth e®ect
through the money supply, and the short supply of farm products in
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general (and, in particular, Higo rice), must have given rise to in°ation-
driven consumption activity, to some acceleration of growth and to a
qualitative upgrade of Kumamoto (including growth in the commercial
and non-agricultural sectors). Yokoi's description that `Kumamoto had
rich mind among all classes of people. They did needless luxury to obtain
food, clothing and housing, and then were in the similar °ourishing
condition to areas of three capitals [Kyoto, Edo and Osaka] in modern
days' (Nippon Shiseki Kyokai [1977a], 66), expresses a certain truth.
Therefore, the consumption of people through the °oating e®ect in
the Kumamoto-economy spread clothes, textile, ornament, dyeing and
accessories; luxury of eating and cooking; building of housing, interior
and garden in the life style in all aspects. Yokoi said that they
were not purchased according to peoples' funds, but were decided on
the assumption of `purchasing goods' (Nippon Shiseki Kyokai [1977a],
66-68). There was `bad air' that existed in the consumption intention
among people, rather than merchants' `desire for gain'. In other words,
their diversi¯cation and deepening concerning consumption in Kumamoto
were that the consumption structure by the demonstration e®ect was
established.
The change in the consumption structure in Kumamoto have in°uenced
not only the luxury e®ect but also the industrial structure through
the °uctuation in demand for goods. Moreover, the idea of this local
industrialisation being achieved through with `domestic production' or
the in°uence of the export-import trade on Kumamoto was not unknown
inside the han. Unfortunately, we cannot ¯nd a description about its
e®ects on the regional industry in Jimusaku. There was a distance between
such description of Jimusaku and his basic idea that was `enriching the
country' through the promotion of industry as an essential ingredient;
namely, it was his di®erent view concerning the macro framework of
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production and consumption including the han and the world trade by
Yokoi's Three National Policy Theories.
Yokoi clearly acknowledged that the tri°ing legalism of Kumamoto han
did not lead to provide with good lives in all classes of people steadily,
through the fact of their consumption activities under `the peacefully
national institution' (that is, the closing system)(Nippon Shiseki Kyokai
[1977a], 68-69). Just now the han government was receiving `the happiness
without example in history' by accident. However, this was limited
to the income-earning capacity of the han government. `Any direct
pathway', as the structural economic policy stepping up the economic
life of `the samurai and the ordinary people', was not built. Such a
distortion would be caused if the pro¯tability of the han government
alone is pursued from the Kumamoto economy in general. However, the
han government could not determine any action as a political-economic
subject that represented public interest guaranteeing the rule among
people orderly (Nippon Shiseki Kyokai [1977a], 69).
Certainly, even if the criticism of Jimusaku had been true, the following
socio-economic problems that followed would not have been solved by
`the thrift of sages', in which Confucianism had emerged as an ideal,
that is, by the mutual cooperation of `the upper and the lower classes'
(the samurai and the ordinary people) (Nippon Shiseki Kyokai [1977a],
69).
As long as the framework from Miscellaneous Impressive Memos in
Studying in Edo to Jimusaku was maintained; even if the thrift theory
by the mutual cooperation of `the upper and the lower classes' had
criticized the manner of the past han administration, it could not have
discussed `enriching the country' of Japan and Japanese local districts,
from production, consumption, growth and the investment cycle on the
qualitative upgrade of the economic framework.
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(2) `The politics of money-making'
With the economic situation that existed between `the samurai and the
ordinary people' in Kumamoto, as stated in the section on `the politics
of thrift', how should `the road of ¯nance' that the han government
adopted be assessed? Yokoi spoke about the ideal way of ¯nance in
The Book of Rites, which was based on the principle that `is calculated
beforehand according to a long-term viewpoint, and as a result, expenses
are scheduled' (Nippon Shiseki Kyokai [1977a], 70). Furthermore, `the
revolt in Kuma in these days' meant `mushroom mountain riots' that
the Hitoyoshi han (the next-door han to Kumamoto) brought about
in 1841 (Nippon Shiseki Kyokai [1977a], 70). For these reasons, there
were sharp con°icts around production between the government and the
common people with regard to what was o®-limits in the production
region and what had to be compulsorily cultivated. In particular, the
monopoly system greatly a®ected the characteristics of products through
the ¯nance provided by speci¯c merchants, the content and quality of
the products, the securing of sales routes, and the instruction provided
at the technical level. Excess pro¯ts tended to be concentrated in
the relationship between speci¯c merchants and the han government in
relation to speci¯c ¯nancial o®ers, sales, the collection of cargo, and
technology.
Judging from Yokoi's description of Jimusaku, `the large harm of
the nation had no load that was more extreme than \politics of
money-making" to collect heavy tax. If the han government doesn't stop
this policy, people won't feel easy about any moment' (Nippon Shiseki
Kyokai [1977a], 70). It was clear that the han government did not value
the mutual cooperation involved in `the upper classes and the lower
classes helping one another' (ibid.), and, as a result of the monopoly
system, the han government was not the appropriate political-economic
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agent for pursuing the public interest.
The monopoly system of Kumamoto that Jimusaku brings to mind
was a model based on the reforms of Horeki (1751-1764), introduced
by Hosokawa Shigekata to try to rebuild the han ¯nances. Its ¯nancial
foundation was based on an earning securing plan based on Japan wax
trees and Japan wax. The productivity levels of wax, as a result of how it
was cultivated, were poor. The amount of production was approximately
less thau 20%, and the process was very time consuming. However,
the potential of wax made from its seeds was big in terms of the size
of its earnings. The manufactured wax had excellent storage qualities.
The longer it was stored, the better was its quality. As the wax-candle
had surpassed other sources of light for its quality since the mid-term
of the Edo period, it could not be substituted by other products.
The more economic society in the late Edo period developed, the
greater was the demand for wax. The wax-candle was able to command
a high price even in markets outside of the territory, and was a product
for which there was a lot of income elasticity. Furthermore, it was grown
on cultivated ground that would otherwise not have been used for crops
associated with the original tax base, such as rice and vegetables. That
is, it could be grown even in mountainous areas, on wasteland, and on
unoccupied ground. The advantage of having a source of revenue was
great because the collection of wax seeds formed part of the farmer's
leisure activities in winter.
As for the reason why the han government promoted the monopoly
policy about the wax-candle, the han's disposal part except the stipends
for feudal retainers was indispensable for the Edo stay in the lord
family and the daimyos' alternate-year residence according to this stay
and `Otetstudai-bushin' (public works allotment, the site of construction
work under the shogunate order). They were necessary `to advance the
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decentralisation of the local powers and to raise the e®ect of centralisation'
as their permanent ¯scal resources. Originally, the administrative expense
in `the home-country', which should be the core of an administrative
measure, was about 20 percent. Yokoi's criticism to the monopoly
policy of the wax-candle in `politics of money-making' was related to
the bakuhan structure closely.
However, based on (1) the purchase price of wax seeds, and (2)
the method of unfavourably calculating wages, the han government for
the product income maximisation realised the price di®erence based on
the marginal element cost and the revenue of marginal products. The
han government expected to make a lot of excess pro¯t based on this
margin and the amount of purchases conducted at that time. Only
wax generated the same income as 6% of Higo rice, and it was the
maximum shipping among goods or as 3% of the total expense level
of the han. In addition, in the case that business taxes and various
o®ertory revenues were joined, the role of wax which was speci¯c ¯scal
resources was larger.
`The wax-candle o±ce' was more than a simple administrative and
supervising agency. It was a special `pro¯t-making enterprise', `an
economic policy' and `annual revenue procurement' organisation. As
the greater part that deducted the part of stipends was for Edo needs
and extra expenses as public works allotment, the han government was
interested only in the earnings of this article (Kamata [1998], Part 1
Ch. 1). The new role of the han government in ¯nance and the economy
had upset the natural order of things through its pursuit of private
pro¯ts.
`The wax-candle o±ce' upset the economic framework of the mutually
bene¯cial cooperation involving `the upper classes and the lower classes
helping one another' (Nippon Shiseki Kyokai [1977a], 71). Moreover, the
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income obtained from it neither returned to the domain nor created
new investment opportunities. It was only used to exhaust expenses
to maintain public works allotment and the alternate-year residence in
Edo based on the bakuhan system without being shared by political
economy in Kumamoto.
As Yokoi said, `it was a means to rescue the administrators in an
emergency at that time, which was not the rationale and has been
considered by the country's interests' in the historical process after Horeki
years. This amounted to `an illogical and temporary policy', brought
about by `the economic policy of the han government's prioritising of
enterprise'. The people in charge of the han administration did not
tackle from the front the working out of those policies. Rather, it was
the `o±ces' of the low-grade organisations that promoted these policies,
such as `the department of money making' (Nippon Shiseki Kyokai
[1977a], 71-72).
If `the administrators did not abandon the means for the government
to pro¯t, and could not decide the way of the rich country that took
care of the way for the whole country's pro¯ts', what Yokoi said was
tantamount to saying that it was necessary to change `the economic
policy of the government enterprise priority' completely and to devise a
reasonable political-economic mechanism (Nippon Shiseki Kyokai [1977a],
72). It was important to distinguish sharply between the role of the
han government and the pro¯t-pursuing activities of the han, for which
the goal setting should have been di®erent. This was the main criticism
of the `politics of money-making' made by Yokoi.
However, how will production and consumption in Kumamoto be
capable of being expressed in the `realist' direction (Jitsugaku) for
political economy in the future? How could Japan's political economy
and its structure be advanced beyond the local districts? Does any
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system correspond to an industrial activity suitable for political economy,
that is, providing a `road to enriching the country' if the `politics of
money-making' do not rely on the monopoly system as a speci¯c and
economic activity? This perspective has been left unresolved in Jimusaku
in the Tenpo stage.
Yokoi's various proposals in Jimusaku can be su±ciently appreciated
for providing continuous stability to the regional economy. However,
Yokoi's fundamental direction has still stayed in his criticism of the rigid
principle of ordinance management that was extremely given priority to
the system decided for legislation beforehand by the han government
(Nippon Shiseki Kyokai [1977a], 76-79).
IV The presupposition of `the reason for international trade'
and Iryo-Ousestu-Taii (the Receiving Outline for Foreigners):
The political-economic thought of breaking free from
a `the closed system'
There was a limit in Yokoi's criticism of Jimusaku in the 1840s,
to organically relate production, consumption, local districts by way
of the investment cycle and `the rich country of Japan' as a whole,
which corresponded to the economic framework of Kumamoto. His new
methodological assumption of `pro¯ts from trade for a rich country' and
`the reason for international trade' comprised a lasting order for which
stability had to be developed.
(1) The deepening of Yokoi's analysis in Junreki-sho (Tour Record)
Yokoi's criticism of the han government and his thinking, which were
based on `the true realist direction', as displayed in Jimusaku, was not
accepted by the highest ranks of the Kumamoto han. Even if there was
a distortion in a reasonable social distribution with monopolisation, or
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even if there were the expansion and the transformation, accompanied
by the economy and the consumption structure in Kumamoto, how can a
substitution of `usefulness' with the immediate e®ect taking the place of
the exclusive system in the ¯nancial policy be found? Furthermore, how
could these urgent ¯nancial matters be settled? Yokoi could not clearly
provide answers to these problems. Though politics and learning based
on `the true realist direction' were said not to have been followed since
the Horeki reforms implemented by Hosokawa Shigekata, was not the
han administration in the hands of retainers who had learnt the texts
of Confucianism? Yokoi's thinking, and that of people who supported
it, did not form a major part of `the common bureaucratic sense' of
the Kumamoto han (Nishioka [2001], 66-68).
The purpose of Yokoi's Junreki-sho in 1851 was to observe the condition
of the political economy that had been developed in western Japan
apart from Kumamoto in terms of `the route to people's standards' or
`the route to public welfare through its interests', and to absorb their
experience from Yanagawa (now the Fukuoka prefecture) to Kishuu (now
the Wakayama prefecture) in his learning.
The contents of Junreki-sho were in `a ¯ne story' about the basic
design of the economy and the ¯nance based on the social learning for
`the urgent necessity of the rich country'. Particularly Yokoi got their
useful bene¯ts through the circulation production relationship between
`the wax-candle o±ce' and the han's note, or through meeting with Ueda
Sakunojo (1787? 1864) (who went on various tours after his retirement)
in Kumamoto and Shimonoseki (Nippon Shiseki Kyokai [1977a], 828?
829).
Ueda's economic policy system in Kaga from the Tenpo to the Kaei
periods (the 1840s to the early 1850s) comprised the abolishing of levies
(komononari) based on the monopoly system, seeking the basis of ¯nance
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for `all of the people's pro¯ts', the shipment of special products from the
Kaga han (at present, the Ishikawa Prefecture and the Toyama Prefecture)
as an industrial policy, relaxing the money supply and demands of
private organisations, and substituting/accumulating the specie (based
on the currency of gold and silver forms) as credit instruments that
could promote industry through han notes. Ueda's policy theory, which
encompassed agricultural administration, was generally based on the
`signs of the northern land' in Kaga, which perfectly encapsulated the
economy and the ¯nances of the entire Kaga. Concerning Yokoi himself
with Ueda's political details, the combination of the practical learning
of `social facts' and `the necessity for the rich country' would have
provided many bene¯ts to Yokoi to advance his ideas.
However, methodologically there would have remained quite a few
problems for the economy in terms of `enriching the country' (a
general promotion of the industrial economy) as part of `the reason for
international trade', even if Yokoi had obtained some realistic suggestions
from Junreki-sho. In considering the methodological framework between
`the reason for international trade' and `enriching the country', a new
answer to the phase of the appearances of Perry and Putyatin, who
visited one after another, was necessary after Junreki-sho.
(2) The conversion of a methodology for `the way of a rich country'
and `the moral logic of reception' in Iryo-Ousestu-Taii (the Receiving
Outline for Foreigners)
Iryo-Ousestu-Taii (1863) was written for Kawaji Toshiakira6) who was
6) Kawaji (1801-1868) was a vassal of the shogun at the end of the Edo era,
holding the positions of a commissioner of ¯nance and as a foreign magistrate,
and ¯nally worked in Japanese coastal defence. He made the Japan-Russia
amity agreement with Putyatin as a plenipotentiary in Nagasaki.
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an acquaintance of Yokoi from his Edo years when he had studied in
Edo and was a diplomatic representative for Russia, and dealt with the
manner in which Japan should treat the US's and Russia's envoys, who
had visited one after another.
In Iryo-Ousestu-Taii Yokoi completely changed his posture of choosing
the political-economic system between the isolation and `the interest of
trade' alternatively in Miscellaneous Impressive Memos in Studying in
Edo, and wrote the viewpoint of `the public way of national policy'
based on `the principle of trade' as the assumption of political-economic
system. In such a case, did `the public way of national policy' mean
to `trade with any country freely'? This was not the case, according
to Yokoi. As already proven in `trade' with China (Qing) and the
Netherlands under `the closed system', the standard of `the principle
of trade' was a result of `that reason' whether `the nations defended
faith without violating or without doing the cruelty or not'. That is
to say, it `did obey the universal mind', and was concerning whether
they were `nations of the righteous road' or `nations of the unrighteous
road'. `The universal principle of trade' that Yokoi considered dealt with
whether the principle of `communication, trade, and commerce' could be
accomplished in view of `faith based on the real public reason' before
using the standard of whether it was a capitalist or market economy. In
terms of the principle that `faith is the public way of national policy
as heaven and earth, or as benevolence and righteousness, through all
nations', Yokoi, following Iryo-Ousestu-Tai, sought to understand the
`interest of trade' as `the reason for trade'. In other words, `faith through
all nations' was able to say that a just cause changed over to be the
standard of comparative system in the world.
Using Yokoi's vision of his early political economic thought as follows,
the issue of `the reason for trade' in `the opening up of the country' by
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`the righteous road' in both Japan and the rest of the world (Powers)7)
is a value of a, and the case of seeking `the opening of the country' by
`the unrighteous road' in the rest of the world is a value of b, even if
aiming at `the opening of the country' in Japan. The issue of choosing
`the closed country' by `the unrighteous road' in Japan, even if aiming
at `the opening of the country' to the world, is a value of c, and the
case of forcibly having to choose `the closing of the country' in Japan
through `the unrighteous road', including through the Western powers,
is a value of d. Let us assume that a>b>c>d is the relation between
each value.
???????????????????? ??????? ???????
????????? ? ?
??????????? ? ?
If so, there is no `reason for trade' based on `the unrighteous road',
even if `pro¯ts from trade' are large. Therefore, Japan would not choose
`the opening of the country'. In other words, when the Western powers
tried to negotiate `the opening of the country' by `the righteous road',
and `the reason for trade' through `the opening of the country' by
`the righteous road', the case of choosing `the closed country' by `the
unrighteous road' would constantly be less. That is to say, `the closed
system' in Japan was as great a disadvantage as `the national policy'.
As a precondition for what kind of economic system should be
chosen, this led to Yokoi's insistence that the political-economic regime
of `the open system' allowing access to the world as `the national
policy' was preferable. `Keisei-ron' (the doctrine of political economy),
7) Here the West powers also were in the same rank as `all the nations of the
world'.
|108|
?????????????????????????
which considered the overseas factors of imports and exports, was ¯rmly
established.
`The national policy' in Yokoi's view did not have to be changed if
`the reason for the natural universe' of all nations was not fundamental.
If this was not arranged, the political-economic system would be such
that the sustainability of free trade and exchange would not have existed
under the universal international order. Moreover, in Iryo-Ousestu-Taii,
Yokoi stressed that to force `trade pro¯ts' on an existing nation was not
the just way to achieve a `rational economic ambience', using virtual
land and sea army power as `any threat to believe' (Nippon Shiseki
Kyokai [1977b], 12-14). Utilising military powers under the limited
rationality, the strategic behaviour of powers that try to obtain the entry
pro¯t misinterpreted a reasonable environment of universal institution,
and then would become imperfect and irrational countries as `countries
of distrust and unrighteousness'. Therefore, they became `unrighteous
countries' by the application of unconscionable principles. Moreover,
behaving in an unreasonable manner, a permanent sustainability would
not be obtained (ibid.).
In Iryo-Ousestu-Taii, Yokoi, by changing the assumption of the
political-economic system to one that took `the principle of trade' as
being the `public way of national policy', obtained a clue as to where `the
route to people's standards, or the route of public welfare through its
interests' lay in breaking o® any contradiction between Taiko's worries
of `the reason for international trade' in the `Reading of the National
Seclusion Discourse' and `national wealth' only for the Kumamoto han
in Jimusaku.
As for Iryo-Ousestu-Taii, Miyauchi stated that `of the utmost signi¯cance
was the fact that Yokoi, after the ¯rst departure of Perry in the summer
of 1853, stressed that seclusion{contrary to prevailing opinion{was not
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the traditional policy of Japan as witnessed by its thriving overseas
activities in the centuries prior to 1639' ([1970], 273). However, it was
not stated at the outset in Iryo-Ousestu-Taii why overseas trade had
become pro¯table for Japan. Based on Shizuki Tadao's translation of
Miscellaneous Impressive Memos in Studying in Edo and the `Reading
of the National Seclusion Discourse', Yokoi had already a±rmed the
importance of overseas trade. If there was any di®erence between
Iryo-Ousestu-Taii and the `Reading of the National Seclusion Discourse'
(or Miscellaneous Impressive Memos on Studying in Edo) in regard to the
mechanism of the political economy for overseas trade, the `Reading of
the National Seclusion Discourse' and Miscellaneous Impressive Memos
on Studying in Edo can choose either `pro¯ts of trade' or isolation
by the ban on Christianity alternatively under the premise that at all
events trade is indispensable for the West.
On the other hand, in the case of the former Iryo-Ousestu-Taii, when
the West that has actually approached to urge the opening of the
country, it was important to fundamentally change the political-economic
system to get gains for Japanese public welfare and national wealth
with `the good cause of the righteous road' that run through `the public
way of national policy in all nations'.
Therefore, in Three National Policy Theories, Yokoi could not agree
with the conformity to Mito Nariaki (1800-1860)8) that Miyauchi imagined
in grasping the relation of trade to economic development (Miyauchi
[1970], 273). Furthermore, because the standard of the political-economic
system was `pro¯ts of trade' and `faith through all nations', Yokoi
8) He governed the Mito han (now the Ibaraki prefecture) and contributed to
the rise of nationalism and the Meiji restoration. At that time, he was one
of the main leaders of the Joi movement (whose activity was focused on
expelling foreigners).
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di®ered from Hashimoto Sanai,9) `who favoured an alliance with Russia'
(Honjo [1940], pp. 366-368). `Although England and the United States
were viewed with distrust, only a few years later men like Hashimoto
and Kawaji, a high shogunal o±cial, were favouring not only intercourse
but also an alliance with Russia', as Miyauch stressed.
V The Fukui han and the Three National Policies
1 Details of the Fukui han's invitation to Yokoi
A leading scholar and the restoration of the han school (in a
word Meidokan) to educate retainers, the people and their children
was necessary to improve the level of the han administration, when
Matsudaira Shungaku (1828-1890)10), the han lord, thought Fukui in
the entire Japan. The Fukui han, which was near Kyoto and Osaka,
was a key centre for Japan's sea trade, and it was located in the
rich grain-producing area of northern Japan. Moreover, it was richer
than other hans in its production of manufactured goods and special
products, and was also rich in terms of access to fund sources based
on those industries and the transportation industry. In spite of this, it
fell into `¯nancial di±culties' and even its legitimacy to rule became
suspect. Fukui reached the stage where it could not help but reconsider
its organisation from the foundation up because it comes from a large
domain owned by a Tokugawa family branch where the in°uence to
the shogunate system was so large. Additionally, it encountered trouble
from abroad. Matsudaira and his aides ceased keeping a ¯rm grip on
Fukui's politics and economy by making policies and regulations, but
9) Hashimoto Sanai (1834-1859) was a samurai from the Fukui han and a
distinguished person in the governmental reforms of the Tokugawa regime.
10) He was an able lord in the Fukui han (now the Fukui prefecture) at the end
of the Edo era. He was called one of the `wise lords' at that time.
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were forced to review it drastically by inviting the scholar to devise the
educational system.
The immediate cause of Yokoi being invited to the Fukui han was
that he stayed in the Fukui castle at the time of making his tour in
1851 and lectured on Gattuko Mondo-sho (Questions and Answers in
School) there. Matsudaira agreed with Yokoi's idea of `the agreement
of study and politics' based on `the way of three generations in Yao,
Shun and U ' that existed in Gattuko Mondo-sho. Matsudaira may have
thought that the policy changeover to opening the country to the world
was going to be sooner or later determined by a situation where there
was unprecedented trouble occurring at home and abroad.
However, by what kind of reasoning and theory was the principle of
the changeover policy secured? How was the process from `the closed
system' to `the open system' explained and made public? A person
who would be able to oversee it from the planning design stage to
where it could be executed was required. Yokoi, as a leading scholar
and an advocate of `the agreement between study and politics' was
a promising person for Matsudaira, who tried to guide the bakuhan
system as `Government President', even if the Kumamoto han continued
to dislike Yokoi.
2 Purpose and composition of `enriching the country'
`Enriching the country' is the main section of the Three National
Policies, which takes the form of questions and answers.
(1) The advantages and disadvantages are contained in the introduction
to the `open system'.
According to Yokoi, the economic grounds for an argument that was
opposed to opening the country to the world were detailed as follows.
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? While useful resources were independent up to now for `isolation of
hundreds of years' (intact) in the forms of self-su±ciency, to trade with
foreign countries now is the same as the export of useful resources for
Japan, or the import of `useless resources'.
? If `output is much more than input' in terms of trade, the
demand-and-supply balance of resources would collapse as an economic
framework.
? Naturally, domestic supply decreases and prices increase because of
supply shortages. In the case of the productive structure under `closed
system' being weak, if the useful materials of the daily goods which
surplus of supply capacity is scarce are exported, demand at home
cannot be satis¯ed. On the other hand, imports are not essential for a
country whose position has been one of `isolation for hundreds of years'.
As the article becomes underestimated supply in useful daily life when
the spare productive capacity turned to the export sector is poor, the
occurrence of a rapid hike in prices cannot be avoided.
? As a result, it is only people involved in trade and bigger merchants
who receive the pro¯ts involved in this trade. The loss of advance in
prices will spread to `all people' as `the harm to trade of opening the
country to the world'.
? Even if gold and silver °ow in, they are `disused and no urgent goods'
in home. The export of a ¯xed amount of a resource cannot solve a
situation of an insu±cient supply of necessary goods. A rapid change in
the prices system, in a word, in°ation, only occurs if there is distortion
in supply and demand (Nippon Shiseki Kyokai [1977a], 29-30).
(2) Yokoi's understanding to `closed economic system'
Is `the closed economic system' an accurate current judgment of
political economy from the viewpoint of `the just cause of the world'?
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Even if `some harm to trade' is partially acceptable, is it possible to
continue to refuse to have communication with Western powers that
have pursued overseas trade as `a national policy' and are rich and
strong?
According to Yokoi, a closed economy that has been in `isolation for
hundreds of years' did not have any historical grounds at all to take
such a stance. It was only `the accepted custom for 200 years', after
the Kanei period of the early Edo era in the 1630s. However, because
of this custom, people had to perceive the `bigger harm' that would
result from continuing to refuse to adopt `the open system'.
Yokoi tried to clarify the basic macro structure of the shogunate system
to make these circumstances clear. At the beginning of the shogunate age,
when the closed economy system began, people's consumption habits,
encompassing food, clothing, and housing, were simple in every way.
People's minds were uncluttered: they did not experience dissatisfaction
in leading such a simple life style so much. However, it is a tendency
of development that people's living standards rise as peaceful times
continue. Along with a living standard rise after `Genna-Enbu' (Peace after
Genna) and the closed economy institution, the e®ect of demonstration
to the market society spread. In addition, the shogunate system was
indispensable for the Edo stay in the lord family and `Otetstudai-bushin',
`to promote the decentralization of local powers and to increase the
e®ects of centralization' through the vast public works allotment and the
compulsion of huge expense in Edo. Nevertheless, the annual revenue
source was limited compared with the amount of expenses; the economic
framework and the feudal estate were still at the same level, although
the population in the territory increased (Nippon Shiseki Kyokai [1977a],
30).
Other classes apart from the samurai were able to increase their
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incomes through raising the costs of their goods and services. However,
the daimyo had their basic income ¯xed in the Kanei period. Their
system did not have the °exibility to change into the ¯scal framework
that matched the economic development. To make up for the annual
expenditure fault, it forced the stipend cutting and a speci¯c product
to resources burden. As the han was assumed to be an instrument of
credit, it relied on ¯nance from wealthy merchants. The accumulation of
evils under the shogunate system for many years in°uenced the welfare
of the samurai and the people (ibid.). In such a situation `disturbances
will be inevitable', according to Yokoi. It was neither an austerity
measure nor an administrative service reduction on the part of the han
government, but it was necessary to convert to the economic regime
that corresponded to the nation's needs, including the living standard,
all at once (Nippon Shiseki Kyokai [1977a], 31-32).
The origin of this problem was clearly the same as the composition of
Jimusaku that Yokoi had written about in the Tenpo period. However,
Jimusaku partly expected the legal system and the laws to be based
on `Tenpo no Kaikaku' (Tenpo Reforms) insofar as they related to the
basic lifestyle. On the other hand, `enriching the country' has already
occurred at the level of rule management. `Revolutionary thrift' as
a fundamental reform of the political-economic structure led to the
conversion to a reasonable economic regime corresponding to the nation's
needs. Basically, in the real world, it was necessary to grope for the
political economic system based on `revolutionary thrift' in a way that
excluded `thrift' in the pro¯ts of the ¯nancial authority.
According to Yokoi, the economic framework of the world is `the
open system' that `the world's nations trade through free navigation'.
If `this just cause of the world' was neglected, Japan, by persisting
in the law of national seclusion, would not be able to escape from
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foreign incursions. Furthermore, with the contradiction of the economic
framework of the shogunate system and domestic trouble, how could `any
plan of defence' be e®ective against `revolts of poor people' domestically?
This is precisely what `the harm of national seclusion' is. Yokoi tried
to give his assumption and suggestion for the conversion to `the world's
nations trade through free navigation to each other like the vicinity'
system in the context of `politics of revolutionary thrift' by sages through
`real reason of universal public' here (Nippon Shiseki Kyokai [1977a],
32).
3 The industrial structure and the export-oriented industrial
policy pattern of the Fukui han
The realistic transformation of economic system for the Fukui han is
natural to originate in the duty through the ability to having control
over Kuni (namely Fukui), although governing a country is possible for
the ¯rst time because of the ability to ruling Japan (Nippon Shiseki
Kyokai [1977a], 32). Through the way of public welfare, this is a vision
whereby the Fukui han would become the model of the political economy
and, by extending it, the political-economy model of all of Japan.
If `faith with the foreign country' are ¯rmly defended on `the way of
trade' as `public way in accord with the circumstances of the world', and
then, `if new pro¯ts by an overseas trade is formulated as a strategy of
¯nancial procurement, the vassal need not increase taxes to the life goods
and Komononari of the people who do not obtain a lot of earnings.
Therefore, the han government need not become thieves by `politics of
money-making in the country' (Nippon Shiseki Kyokai [1977a], 33).
(1) The law of the monopoly system of the Fukui han before opening
up the country
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Let us explain by using chart 1: `the law of the monopoly system
of the Fukui han before opening the country'. Arrow A is provided for
the han government about speci¯c products or manufactured products
at all events. This supply condition is controlled by the ¯nal demand
degree of the product, competing goods and each purchaser's range and
condition (especially with D).
As the o®ered price of arrow B by the han government basically
assumes the buyer's monopoly, the government tries to lower and suppress
the purchase condition of arrow C as much as possible according to
`the politics of moneymaking'. The han government tries especially to
suppress the amount of purchases of B and to acquire the maximum
earnings, looking at the value of sales in E. As for Kuramono and their
stock period of supply-demand, the con¯dence of han note and the
warehouse bill, etc. are used, and they are operated to expect larger
earnings. The han government in Kumamoto behaved `like merchants' by
the direct control work method of the han-owned plant in the market,
including the provision of technological improvements as a business.
However, we cannot believe easily that `private people' accepted
the buyer's monopoly by the han government with regard to various
products, where the opportunity for making big earnings was expected.
If possible, it is assumed that they were sold to `merchants', as arrow
D shows. However, as for speci¯c products and manufactured products
that a demand expansion and new development were able to expect,
any hans held the authority of the wholesale price discrimination by
the buyer's monopoly. Moreover, it was usual for information on the
greater demand, such as in Osaka and Edo, was held by the wholesale
stores and the brokers in these regions. As Yokoi said, the prices of
speci¯c products and manufactured products from `private people' in
those territories were `half the price' of the wholesale prices in Osaka
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Chart 1 `The law of the monopoly system
of the Fukui han before opening the country'
han government 
Metropolises 
(Osaka, Edo, 
and so on) 
Merchants 
‘private people’ 
 (private business or 
independent producers) 
(specific products or 
manufactured products) 
E F
G 
H 
C
D
B
A 
and Edo. If the han government purchased them, this would likely be
at a price that was less than `half price'.
In the arrow E, the competition with other hans, the good and evil of
their quality, their bid sales system (the stock companion's setting and
operation), the fund condition and the method on enforcing a monopoly
system in the han government, and various dealings like allotment of
transportation fees and commissions cost from the local territory to
large demand, are related to the dealings of the han government and
the merchants. The quality in Arrow F a®ects not only the amount of
sales but also the net revenue, depending on charges such as business
taxes and the forced contribution.
In the case of `Merchants', they have the real power about all speci¯c
products and manufactured products of han. As for the knowhow of
direct management work method including the risk-bearing and the
technological quality improvement in Kuramono, any fundraising from
monopoly enterprise, and the maintenance and development of market
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organizing of nationwide scale or the marketing channel excluding Osaka
and Edo through Kabu-nakama (trade guild) such as wholesale stores
and brokers (arrows GH ), they cannot help relying on merchants' ability.
As Yokoi said, the price, the quality assessment operation, and any
information controls on the negotiations were naturally believed to be
performed by Kabu-nakama.
Yokoi's explanation about `the law of the monopoly system of the
Fukui han before opening the country' was a criticism of the han
economic policy in a similar manner to the contents of the `politics of
moneymaking' in Jimusaku in relation to the Kumamoto han during
the Tenpo years.
(2) The industrial policy of `enriching the country'
On the other hand, the industrial policy of `enriching the country' to
become rich for the han government, the samurai, and the ordinary people,
¯rst of all should examine the overseas situation and the `Yokohama and
Nagasaki' markets like Arrow 3. Arrow 2 shows the demand of `private
people', speci¯cally purchase provisions covering various transport costs
and miscellaneous expenses from the han to open ports according to
this market price. With regard to the recent situation of the ports being
opened, as the speci¯c products and manufactured products of the Kuni
were international commodities too, they could be expected to have a
competitive advantage, although it depended on the presence/absence of
the information-collecting ability of `the mercantile houses in Yokohama
and Nagasaki', as illustrated by Arrow 3.
Therefore, `high prices' that had hitherto not existed could be expected
for these products, as shown by Arrow 2.11) As the number of `private
11) In particular, the raw silk that worldwide was in short supply as a result of
a disease outbreak in Europe is an example of this case.
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people' corresponding to Arrow 2 increased naturally, `products in the
country' became the object of the production increase, and earnings
reached several hundred thousand ryo as a total. Of course, as it
was impossible to purchase all products, some of them were sold to
merchants.
However, the han government changed its position on this being
an o±cial monopoly, and it approved of merchants buying and selling
publicly (Arrows 7 and 8 ) in a manner that was di®erent from the past
monopoly system (Arrows 1 and 2 ). According to Yokoi, market prices
were set by the `big merchants', and through them, `Kaisho' (the meeting
place) was established in Fukui and Mikuni. Then the establishment of
the trade market by the `Kaisho' organisation investigated the dealings
of wealthy farmers and wealthy merchants
The organisation of `Kaisho' should pay attention to the selection of
Motojime (President). Through the framework created by him and his
companions, `Kaisho' should deal with the cargo collection of products
freely. Above all `Kaisho' is organised on the location of `Fukui and
Mikuni'. Neither Osaka nor Edo were came the direct administration
of the shogunate when they attained real power with the central issue
of price formation, although it was actually organised in Fukui (Nippon
Shiseki Kyokai [1977a], 33). Even if there is a link of the political
cost of the han with the economic factor, as the production location
relates to problems of shipping expense between regions, production cost,
stock expense, and communications cost etc., it is more advantageous to
control of real power in the castle city and the outer port for it. When
`ports in Yokohama and Nagasaki' or foreign countries are considered
as the market, as the reason for the sales base, there is no reason that
has already been limited only domestically
Through reviewing arrows 1 ? 4 ? 6?7 ? 9 or 7 ? 11, even if the
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Chart 2 The industrial policy of `enriching the country'
Han government
foreign
countries
Metropolises 
(Osaka, Edo, and 
so on)
‘Big merchants’ :
‘Kaisho’ in Fukui
and Mikuni
‘Private people’ (private 
business or independent 
producers)
‘ports in
Yokohama and
Nagasaki’
3 4 1
2
5
6
11
12
8 7
10 9
supply reinforcement is practicable and it is possible to secure the
marketing channels of those products for export, the problem is whether
the export capacity can really promote `private people' to a possible
business scale.
If `Kaisho' by the route of Arrow 3 ? 2 certainly transmits that
information to `private people' through the han of Arrow 10 and 11
? 3, the uncertainty relating to `trade' can decrease cumulatively, and
an increase in supply as a result of the synergy e®ect can be hoped
for. However, because past investment in those products was capital
investment from the viewpoint of the `merchant', `even though products
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are made or tend to increase', to engage in capital investment, businesses
in the past could not have succeeded because of a lack of funds, the
character of products, the structure of the external market, and the
uncertainty of the scale selection between various activities. In particular,
compared with Kuramono, which was domestically oriented, the industrial
policy of `enriching the country' based on the trade including foreign
countries is not small at the rotation of the business fund and at the risk
according to troubles and periods. Therefore, to solve these problems,
as for the fundraising through Arrow 2, `convenience' furnished `private
people' with low interest or interest free is explained. Yokoi suggested
that this type of loan should be loan funds provided by government,
such as motoshikomi12), fujiki13), and `cost of night soil'14). Because
loan funds were provided by government, `private people' did not have
to deal with `business funds charged at high rates' by merchants in
uncertain undertakings. In the course of arrows 1 ? 4 ? 6, `even if
loan funds by the government were not able to recover the pro¯ts of
the principal, the pro¯ts of the government would be obtained from
abroad' (Nippon Shiseki Kyokai [1977b], 34).
Next, where ¯nancial support was arranged in order to promote
domestic and foreign dealings, problems of `various articles, machines
and methods to their growth and manufacturing methods for the private
sector', and moreover the infrastructures necessary to construct these
technologies in the wider sense could not be avoided. If `private business'
tackled such problems of `various articles, machines and methods to
manufacture them or their growth and manufacturing methods', these
12) The cost of preparation or the adjustment costs for providing the framework.
13) It was not only millet, but also meant government loans for relief in times
of economic di±culty.
14) Human feces used especially for fertilizing the soil.
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problems had widespread external e®ects. On the other hand, it is
necessary to have the aspect of public knowledge value. Then, though
Yokoi maintained that `at ¯rst the o±ce tried to conduct an experiment
on various articles or services, and after such an experiment it is
necessary to guide people through a conscientious compassion', this also
had one side of the intellectual superiority by the han which would like
to hold a leading part of production and the sale that might disperse
outside the domain (Nippon Shiseki Kyokai [1977b]?35).
However, according to Yokoi, under quali¯cation of public knowledge
in the intellectual superiority by the han, though it can develop much
production methods, farming, and an appliance including `sericulture
art', and though by the way of them he agrees with the experiment
of the han that practises the e±ciency of which `human strength is
omitted very much' or increases labour and capital of productivity;
safety as the obligation of public organization should be opened to
people `to not only examine it enough in the han government but also
win people's trust'. It is the reason why `popular feelings' repulse and
social friction grows, `even if these are convenience new matters are
forced' (cf., Nippon Shiseki Kyokai [1977b]?35). Realistically, the past
technique, the resource distribution (manpower, an industrial tradition,
their related ¯eld, and natural resources and climate), the culture and
the history tradition in that region are important. Because there is still
concern that an easy improvement only as for economic e±ciency may
cause social friction and bring a negative e®ect in the whole society
(ibid.).
Though it has described here about special products, the things that
`rice and money are lent, convenience is taught, and their pro¯ts are
derived from their active business' is the same as the entire `commerce
and industry' sector. This policy aimed for making engaged in working
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of the export promotion type through which `fellows of idleness were
made to start in each occupation according to their favour', and to make
it use for `enriching the country'. And, it imagined `loans' concerning
them if there were lack in the fund, the technological problem, the
know-how, and information to establish in such ¯elds (Nippon Shiseki
Kyokai [1977b], 35-36). In a word, Yokoi sought to achieve the target of
`enriching the country' through an industrial policy and a development
strategy that focused on opening the country, replacing the thinking of
the han administration, which had considered only the ¯scal revenue and
the expenditure of the han up to that point. Such an industrial policy
can equally be understood as uniting `private people', who thus far had
been divided according to their `agriculture, industry, and commerce'
activities, as economic agents. Moreover, it presents a picture to `private
people' that the `persons in charge of the han government' have to work
within the framework of any management or monitoring mechanism with
the utmost e®ort.
(3) The method of `the general exchanger of domestic products' as
actually practised in Fukui
The point that the method of `the general exchanger for domestic
products' actually practised in Fukui' by the chief of the Production
Bureau, Mitsuoka Hachiro (known as Yuri Kimimasa), and kanjo-bugyo
(commissioner of ¯nance in Fukui), Hasebe Zinbei replaced the industrial
policy of `enriching the country' of Yokoi illustrated in chart 2, was
`the general exchanger for domestic products' which Yokoi called `big-
merchants' or `Kaisho'. `The general exchanger for domestic products'
was constituted of the motojimeyaku (securer of the foundation) and
the tonya (wholesale merchants), and the han government (that is,
the council of the Chief of the Production Bureau, the magistrate of
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the city <Fukui>, the commissioner of ¯nance and kori-bugyo <the
magistrate of the county> ). This body played a supervision, guidance,
and adjustment role for `the general exchanger', `private people' and
the Fukui mercantile house in Yokohama, and the Nagasaki trade. In a
word, the transactions of private products were uni¯ed by `the general
exchanger for domestic products'. Although the role sharing between
`big merchants' for private products and the han government was not
clearly set out in Yokoi's idea, the role of `the general exchanger for
domestic products', as practised in Fukui, established the form of the
transaction method.
4 The model of political-economic policy: An imitation of the
West or an original political economy?
The last important question is whether trade and commerce are a
form of Western institutionalisation or whether the policy conversion is
an original form of political economy if put at the centre of the political
system. Yokoi said that any claim that engaging in trade and commerce
was an imitation of the West was super¯cial. That is, according to the
sages in ancient China, a development policy that prioritised trade and
commerce and enriched society was the system of political economy that
existed originally in East Asia (Nippon Shiseki Kyokai [1977a], 38).
As shown by the Shujing (the Book of History), in the oldest classic,
in which sages' thoughts were collected as the peculiar theory of heaven
and earth, six of the fundamental laws between heaven and earth relate
to trade (that is, laws that are added for mankind's life through water,
¯re, metal, tree, soil, and corn). By using them, Yao and Shun developed
the country by promoting a form of trade according to the `reason
of nature', namely `three types of conduct' (`virtue, usefulness, and
public welfare') (ibid.). Next, `U ', who succeeded Shun, accomplished
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the `encouragement of new industry' and made social infrastructural
improvements in `nine rivers and the seven seas', encompassing °ood
controls, canals, harbours, and circulation. He bore in mind so that
both the population and overall wealth could grow. `Three generations
of Yao, Shun and U ' are basic components of the political economy
in the East long ago, and their policy thinking is `the basic principle
of morals (bene¯cence, education, and benevolent rule) which the sages
established' (Nippon Shiseki Kyokai [1977a], 38).
The industrial exploitation and opening ports which came up the
wide policy platform through `public opinion' based on doctrines of
Yao, Shun and U and well, became steps to `enriching the country' by
samurai and people (Nippon Shiseki Kyokai [1977a]?348). `Politics of
money-making' based on , so to speak, `sel¯sh motives after Qin-Han
dynasty', which only the han government aimed in fact and `(political
economy's) scholars so far in Tang (China) and Japan overlooked any
serious defect of sel¯sh motive', obtained the chance to `do ablation' by
way of `the public way of the world' by `the reason for international
trade'.
Therefore, the mechanism of the shogunate system never had any
legitimate in sage's genealogy. `When the peace and the security of
the nation were realised, though all members of the loyal sta® exerted
their capacity owing to the stability and prosperity of the family of
Tokugawa', they had not looked back to `all of the people's happiness'.
On that account, in the political-economy to make steady `private a®airs
of the family', `lords of hans also wish for the prosperity and security of
their family only with sovereign and subjects together along this line.
Owing to becoming the custom where a neighbouring han is considered
enemy, all shogunate, daimyos and their good government o±cials have
prejudice of the national seclusion, and are going to shut their country.
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Moreover, because not only these matters but also the territory country
and their human nature try to shut, such a situation without `interactive
opening to tra±c and communication' among people cannot escape any
disadvantage and any damage. As they gave themselves to the monarch
and just thought of the Tokugawa and each han sel¯shly, happiness of
general people was spoiled and trust of people to the government went
away' (Nippon Shiseki Kyokai [1977a]?38-39).
In contrast to Japan, the U. S. since Washington has strictly carried
out three major policies (renunciation of war, to become rich in the
political-economy by seeking knowledge, and to hand over the power
of the President through choosing a sage like Yao, Shun and U ). As
a result, it has succeeded to introduce and apply `all excellence of
the world' from the legal system to instrument/technology with the
viewpoint of publicness. The event exactly is ideal politics by glorious
reign. In the case of the UK's political-economic system, it is a form
of public consensus that `is familiar with the conditions of people' and
that `consults with people by all means'. About the economies of such
the U.S. and the U.K., `they correspond to politics and education, and
are the political-economy by ethics for people. This corresponds exactly
with the political and educational systems of the three generations of
Yao, Shun, and U ' (Nippon Shiseki Kyokai 1977a, 39-40).
However, Yokoi noted the following: `I do not dare respect the Western
style. Moreover, I won't say \imitate Western civilisation, and its art
and science system." I do not want you to make a mistake in this
regard' (Nippon Shiseki Kyokai [1977a], 38-39). The creation of the
West's `wealth and power' of the West was, for him, due to `world
trade'. According to the standard of `the public way' by `the righteous
road', Yokoi as a Confucian scholar derived universal ethics from an
individual/family to han administration/Japan/the world, based on a
|127|
?????? 69 ?? 2 ?
well? cultivated mind of real learnings and `public opinion'.
If the discrepancies that arise at various stages are caused by Yokoi's
standpoint, their gaps can be resolved by the policy objective of `enriching
the country'. The policy instruments that can smoothly solve them are
the various industrial policies aimed at `enriching the country' and are
`practised' by the ¯nancial policy of capital creation in the form of `the
Dajokan-satsu' issued by the Daijokan (the Grand Council in the Meiji
new government) in place of `han note'.
VI Conclusion: Yokoi after `enriching the country'
It is said that the practice of Yokoi's doctrines by Mistuoka at ¯rst
started business through one hundred thousand ryo by `silver note', and
especially was lent through each business within the Fukui han and `the
general exchanger for domestic products'. Hundreds of thousands ryo
were saved as specie including the Ezo trade (now Hokkaido trading) in
the safe of the Fukui han from the ¯rst ¯scal year of Bunkyu periods.
The ¯nance of Fukui that the de¯cit of several tens of thousands of ryo
had been continued under monopoly system?became reversed situation
(cf. Matsuura [2000], 181-182; Mikami [1999], 77-88). The action of the
enriching country plan by Yokoi brought a large e®ect to the Fukui
han, and its existence became well-known in the whole country.
The Fukui region got excited over the boom. Not only agricultural/
industrial/commercial class but also the development of industry by
samurai arrived at much active situation. In spite of Mistuoka coming from
the Fukui han that had supported the shogunate system, the practical
success he achieved in industry and the monetary policy guaranteed
his position as one of the main statesmen in charge of the ¯nance
department of the new Meiji government and the section that encouraged
new industry with `the Dajokan-satsu' (the Meiji government's paper
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money) and the policy of the Commerce O±ce.
Up until then, there had been no political economist who `discovered
the foundation of Confucianism as a principle of exchange all over the
world', and accomplished the uni¯cation of theory and practice according
to `this success'. After the Qin-Han dynasty, ?`the governments') private
views of the country's isolationist stance were never sincere'. Therefore,
the usual doctrines applied in the previous political economy were only
satis¯ed with the interpretation of religious scriptures. The uni¯cation
of the theory and policy of Yokoi's political economy was to understand
that `to control house and country is the same thing as knowing the
way of sincerity over the world under Yao and Shun. This is true for
Jitsugaku. Only this learning can treat the impossible phenomenon in
the past doctrines' (Nippon Shiseki Kyokai [1977a]?350).
When searching for the truth of Eastern learning from ancient times
and arriving at the theory and the policy of `three generations of Yao,
Shun, and U ', Yokoi examined the following questions. Why did the
shogunate system su®er from confusion and why did it su®er from the
external pressure of the Western powers? Yokoi himself understood
these matters seemed to be `impossible phenomenon' after the late Edo
period. He was able to aim the political-economic system at `enriching
the country' through `private business'.
The thinking of the basic policy of the Meiji government, that is, the
`Imperial Covenant Consisting of Five Articles', made know in March
1868, was not irrelevant to Yokoi. As a Confucian, he was able to
receive the status of `Jushii-no-ge (Junior Fourth Rank, Lower Grade),
Sanyo (councillor)' after the Meiji Restoration, and participated in the
planning of the new govenment. However, the modern Meiji was after
all `his last will's days' for this scholar who was born in the Bunka
era and completed his achievement in the Tenpo era. Yokoi who has
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already been sick doesn't seem to have spent the Meiji era long too
much even if not assassinated in Kyoto 1869.
Investigating `the learning of truth' from the method of recognising
the comparative system, as a result, after Restoration, the purpose
and the procedure as political-economic policy model by `enriching the
country' and `open discussion', were left. Beyond the `encouragement of
new industry', how did Yokoi's policy thinking connect with an original
political economy model based on the modernisation process after the
Meiji era? Investigating such an issue seems hugely important today.
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